WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM A FAILURE OF ALLIANCES? A CASE STUDY BETWEEN DUTCH AND AMERICAN COMPANIES by Wahyuni, Sari
Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Indonesia 
Vol. 23, No. 1, 2008, 43 – 56 
 
WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM A FAILURE OF ALLIANCES?  
A CASE STUDY BETWEEN DUTCH AND AMERICAN COMPANIES1 
Sari Wahyuni 
Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia 
(sari@pascafe.ui.ac.id) 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Penelitian-penelitian terdahulu menunjukkan bahwa banyak stratejik alliansi yang 
kandas di tengah jalan. Kendati aliansi tersebut diawali dengan komitmen yang tinggi dan 
diikuti dengan usaha yang berkesinambungan untuk menghasilkan aliansi yang sukses 
tapi tetap saja banyak aliansi yang terhenti di tengah jalan. Pertanyaan utama yang 
diajukan dalam riset ini adalah: Faktor-faktor penting apa sajakah yang perlu 
dipertimbangkan manajer untuk membentuk aliansi yang sukses? Dengan menggunakan 
kualitatif riset, penelitian ini berusahan menggali faktor-faktor penting tersebut. Studi 
kasus antara Avebe dan Noveon merupakan sebuah contoh  alliansi internasional yang 
diwarnai dengan hubungan yang sangat harmonis anta wakil perusahaan di dalam 
alianasi tersebut, hampir tidak ada konflik di antara mereka dan kerjasama ini berhasil 
membuat produk yang sangat unggul di dunia pertekstilan. Anehnya, aliansi ini kandas 
setelah 4 tahun berjalan. Pelajaran berharga yang dapat kita petik dari kerjasama lintas 
budaya ini diharapkan dapat membantu para manajer dalam mengembangkan aliansi 
mereka. 
Keywords:  Strategic Alliances, Failure, Partner Contribution, Control, Conflict, Inter-
dependency, Communication 
 
INTRODUCTION1 
It is look like roller coaster, forming and 
managing complex international relationships 
place a great burden on the managers 
involved. The specific characteristics of ISAs 
(joint decision-making, constant bargaining, 
and clash of interests) make them unstable 
form of organizations. In a study that 
examined the fate of 880 alliances, Harrigan 
(1988) found that only 40% survived four 
years in existence and that fewer than 15% 
lasted longer than a decade. Other studies 
                                                 
1 The author would like to express an in-depth gratitude to 
Ubbo Ummius Foundation, University of Groningen, 
the Netherlands whom financed this study. 
highlight the fact that more than 50% of all 
alliances with shared management disappear 
or are completely reorganized within less than 
five years of their creation (Killing 1988). 
Bleeke and Ernst (1993) study demonstrates 
that more than two-thirds of all alliances 
encounter serious problems during their first 
two years in existence. This high mortality 
rate seems to confirm the most cautious, if not 
openly negative, opinions about the 
complexity of such relationships expressed by 
alliance managers. A need, therefore, exists 
for a more thorough and cohesive insight into 
the characteristics and dynamics of strategic 
alliances and their key success factors.  
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The current literature on ISA’s has paid 
considerable attention to either the very 
beginning of the venture (in the tradition of 
modal choices) and the ultimate end of the 
alliance, while the mid-life of ISAs has been 
left understudied (Doz 1996; Kandemir et al. 
2002). The complexity and richness of ISAs as 
a unique type of co-operation rests on its 
cross-cultural and cross-organizational 
interactions. While focusing on only the 
opening and the closing games, current 
research has missed the most exciting and 
arguably the most challenging part of the 
story. One of the most promising research 
areas is to reveal the process by which ISA 
development unfolds and which offers insights 
into how to initiate and manage organizational 
changes on an ongoing basis (Tallman and 
Shankar 1994; Lee and Cavusgil 2006, 
Wahyuni et al. 2007).  
Based on the case study of Avebe and 
Noveon alliance, we try to capture the process 
development of their partnership and most 
importantly we try to understand why this 
alliance has been collapsed. The most 
interesting aspect of this alliance is the 
acknowledgement by both companies of the 
excellent relationship they enjoyed during the 
partnership that resulted in a high-quality 
product in the dye printing market. Ironically, 
this alliance dissolved after four years of its 
cooperation and until now both parties are 
unsure about the reasons behind the alliance 
termination. Their partnership can be 
described in three stages: formation, operation 
and evaluation. The lesson we can learn from 
this case hopefully could help manager to 
better manage their alliance.  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research strategy we adopt in this 
study can be characterized as explorative, 
which favours a case study approach. 
According to Yin (1994), a case study is the 
investigation of a contemporary, empirical 
phenomenon within its real life context; when 
the boundaries between a phenomenon and its 
context are not clearly evident; and in which 
multiple sources of evidence are used. Hartley 
(1994) stressed that the key feature of the case 
study approach is not method or data, but an 
understanding of the processes as they occur 
in their context. This type of case study 
research is particularly useful when the 
phenomenon under investigation is difficult to 
study outside its natural setting and also when 
the concepts and variables under study are 
difficult to quantify (Ghauri and Grønhaug 
2005). An in-depth explorative research was 
thus considered most suitable to obtain insight 
into what goes on in a real life situation.  
This study is based on qualitative data on 
ISAs between Avebe (Dutch company) –
Noveon (US company). The selection of 
Dutch-American firms was partly due to the 
researchers’ location in the Netherlands and 
the growing strength of business relationship 
between these two nations. According to the 
U.S. Commercial Service (2002), the 
Netherlands is the third largest foreign 
investor in America, and the U.S. is the largest 
foreign investor in the Netherlands; therefore 
an intensive study in this area is indeed 
necessary to gain an insight on how alliances 
between firms from these two countries have 
been developed. A second consideration 
concerning case selection is that those 
alliances have to be in operation for a 
considerable period of time, so that we can 
study the process of their development. The 
third criterion was that both alliance partners 
should come from the same industry and were 
competitors to capture the “strategic” nature of 
the alliance. The fourth criterion is that the 
companies participating in this research have 
to be willing to co-operate fully. We have to 
be able to interview their international partner 
face-to-face or via the telephone. A full access 
to both partners is indeed important in order to 
be able to obtain a balanced representation 
(Ghauri, 2004).  
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We interviewed managers from both 
companies who are involved in this alliance. 
All interviews are tape recorded. Most of the 
interviews took more than one hour and some 
of them lasted more than two hours. The face-
to-face interviews were semi-structured and 
focused. In order to keep focus, we developed 
two semi-structured questionnaires: one for 
the Dutch company and one for the American 
partner. The questionnaire for the Noveon was 
particularly designed to crosscheck the 
answers given by the Avebe management, 
thereby increasing the reliability of the data 
(Ghauri, 2004).  
FINDINGS 
AVEBE – NOVEON Background of 
Cooperation 
AVEBE is a Dutch company that plays a 
major role in the global marketing, production, 
and development of potato starch and starch 
specialties used in food, pharmaceuticals, 
textiles, paper, and adhesives. Avebe has been 
manufacturing starch-based thickeners for the 
textile printing industry and is acknowledged 
as one of the world’s leading suppliers of 
starch-based thickeners.  
Noveon Inc. (previously known as BF 
Goodrich) is a U.S. leading global producer 
and marketer of technologically advanced 
specialty chemicals for a broad range of 
consumer and industrial applications. In the 
textile industry, Noveon had the broadest line 
of textile chemicals for preparation, printing, 
dyeing and finishing. It was also acknow-
ledged as the world’s largest producer of 
acrylic acid for synthetic polymer. Their broad 
offering of textile ingredients improved fabric 
appearance, texture, durability, flame 
retardance and wrinkle resistance.  
A strategic alliance between Avebe (the 
Netherlands) and Noveon (North America) 
started on March 24, 1995 and was dissolved 
after four years of its cooperation. Their 
agreement related to joint product develop-
ment and distribution of a high performance 
thickener for textile printing applications, 
based on a combination of Noveon’s synthetic 
polymer and Avebe’s modified starches. This 
partnership was a joint force between two 
companies, which have complementary know-
ledge, and markets. Noveon is the largest 
producer/distributor of synthetic polymer, 
marketed under the name of Carbopol resins 
that has an outstanding position in the 
American market. With respect to Avebe, they 
have superior modified starch technology in 
thickening applications, marketed under the 
trade name Solvitose. Avebe has an 
excellent infrastructure in the Far East and 
Europe but lacks one in the American printing 
market. 
This alliance aimed for the joint develop-
ment of a new high-performance thickener (of 
compound) based on combinations of 
Noveon’s Carpobol resins and one or more of 
Avebe’s Solvitose modified starch products 
for textile printing application. By combining 
these two superiorities in technology both 
companies aimed to achieve some synergies. 
One of the advantages is a high quality of 
printing with better color value, brighter 
colors and smoother prints. Soon after they 
invented the joint product, both companies 
signed the marketing agreement and divided 
the world market into two major markets. 
Noveon would market the product in America 
and Caribbean, and Avebe would become 
responsible for the marketing effort in Europe, 
Asia Pacific and Russia. Figure 1 describes the 
scope and the sequence of agreements 
pertaining to this alliance.  
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Figure 1. The Sequence Agreement of Avebe-Noveon Alliance 
 
1. Formation Phase 
Initial Agreement on Partner Contribution  
The agreement for the entire cooperation 
developed step by step, started from joint 
product development and continued with 
marketing agreement of the product (see 
Figure 1). This alliance did not stipulate a 
limited period of partnership. Both parties 
intended to have a long-term relationship to 
develop a product that would enable them to 
satisfy their profit expectation.  
Their alliance agreements were clear for 
both partners. There was no serious dispute 
that was raised during the partnership about 
differences of interpretation concerning those 
contracts. Even the Noveon management 
stated that in terms of formal documents, their 
alliance contract with Avebe was the one that 
was most tightly structured compared to their 
other partnerships (Noveon Marketing Direc-
tor of Performance Coating, 16 May 2002).  
2. Operational Phase 
In the beginning of the operational phase, 
there was an excellent partnership between all 
managers involved in this alliance. Both 
parties conceded that this alliance commenced 
under a strong trust and shared vision between 
the high-level management of Avebe and 
Noveon’s Textile Division.  
This alliance was established under a 
strong vision and belief of our General 
Manager and the Avebe Managing 
Director. These two important people 
were envisioning an ability to make a cost 
competitive product by combining Avebe 
and Noveon expertise. 
(Noveon Marketing Director of 
Performance Coating, 16 May 2002)  
During the product development, the 
Avebe Research Manager together with his 
Senior Scientist Printing had a highly 
motivated working relationship with the 
Noveon R&D Supervisor Textile. The 
exchange of expertise among these three was 
excellent. They worked at each other’s 
laboratories, exchanged the samples and 
strived to find the best formula for their joint 
compound product. In the end, they 
successfully invented a high-quality product 
with an excellent color value and which gave 
smoother prints. Both parties were fully 
satisfied with the mutual relationship during 
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the product development and the great 
performance of the joint product.  
Our relationship in the joint product 
development was excellent. We were very 
open in sharing the knowledge concer-
ning our product development. We did 
our best to create a high-quality product. 
When my partner in Noveon came over, I 
brought him to do some sightseeing in 
Holland. We had dinner at my place and 
spent a weekend together. Professionally 
and personally, we were close. 
(Avebe Senior Scientist Printing, 9 July 
2001)  
The American partner expressed his confidene 
in the product, 
Based on my experience and knowledge, 
I am really putting everything on my 
shoulders to make a statement that if we 
were going to work together again there 
is an opportunity to develop a product 
that can be a benchmark to the industry. 
Nobody can duplicate it. I am very 
confident about that. What we had done 
is a marvelous accomplishment but we 
were not finished with the project we 
undertook. As I mentioned before, my 
vision was to have a 5 to 10 million-
dollar business on this product line but 
we never achieved this. 
(Noveon Senior Regional Manager Asia 
Pacific Performance Coating, 16 May 
2002)  
In the marketing stage, the situation 
turned out to be different. Originally, the 
Avebe Product Manager had actively 
exchanged information (via phone, email and 
regular meeting) with Noveon about the 
marketing issues and the strategy to launch the 
product in the marketplace. Their reciprocal 
communication gradually decreased during the 
introduction of the product in the market due 
to the following reason. Firstly, the sales of 
the joint product did not materialize. Both 
parties faced numerous problems in launching 
the product in the marketplace. Secondly, the 
alliance team was dismantled during the 
marketing of the product. There was re-
organization in both companies’ management. 
The Avebe Product Manager who formerly 
had been in charge of the marketing campaign 
was relocated to a new business unit, whereas 
the Avebe Managing Director moved to 
another company. The momentum of the 
project drastically decreased after they left. 
During this transition period, the Avebe 
Research Manager, who later was promoted to 
be the R&D Director, took on the positions of 
Managing Director and Product Manager. He 
clearly held three functions at the end phase of 
the project. 
Besides a lack of success in the 
marketing activity, in Avebe there were 
two other aspects that made this project 
fail. First, our product manager left. She 
believed in the product, she pushed the 
market, and she left. Thus, we did not 
have the same pushing power anymore. 
Secondly, at that moment there was some 
tension between R&D and marketing 
people in Avebe. We could not talk easily 
with the marketing people. 
(Avebe R&D Director, 17 April 2001) 
In the meantime, Noveon managers who 
were involved in this project also moved to 
different position. Soon after this reorgani-
zation, the commitment of both parties to the 
alliance was slowing down. From that point 
onwards, communication significantly 
decreased. 
In March 1998, Noveon purchased 
Diamalt, one of the Avebe’s competitors. This 
acquisition did speed up the alliance 
termination. The alliance contract that was 
clear in the beginning became blurred for both 
parties. Sharing market information was 
arduous because in the United States, there is 
an anti-trust law that does not allow 
companies to share market information and 
discuss pricing with competitors. Noveon and 
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Avebe started to have difficulties in the 
market because Diamalt and Avebe were 
selling the same starches in Europe and Asia. 
This situation ultimately impeded the success 
of the project because both companies no 
longer shared the marketing information.  
Once we bought Diamalt, our partner 
was looking at us differently than they 
had in the past. They looked at us as a 
competitor instead of their co-supplier 
and customer because we stopped buying 
their product. There was a changing 
perception of what each company was, 
as the company has indeed changed. 
What we did not do was to adapt the 
agreement to those changes. We tried to 
fit in the same agreement even though 
both companies evolved differently.  
(Noveon Vice President of Technology, 
16 May 2002)  
A low degree of interdependency between 
the participating companies is another 
important aspect of this partnership. It is 
tenable that the acquisition of Diamalt has 
changed the position of both companies in the 
textile market. Noveon’s business position, 
which formerly only operated in pigment 
printing, was extended to the natural printing 
thickeners. The degree of interdependencies 
between both companies significantly 
decreased because Noveon did not purchase 
natural starch from Avebe anymore. Since 
both companies had marketed the product 
separately, they did not have a strong 
coordination and obligation to bring the 
product together into the market. Moreover, 
the lack of success in sales had killed the 
focus. This alliance collapsed during the 
operational phase of their partnership.  
By acquiring Diamalt and by not having 
much success on what we set up in the 
alliance agreement, it took all the 
momentum out of this cooperation. There 
is nothing more for anybody to commit to 
more work. You know the customers 
were reluctant to take a high price 
product, we were having a very little 
commercial success, and then we bought 
Diamalt. So, we cannot blame Diamalt 
for the break up of this alliance….it is 
certainly not bringing help. We close that 
chapter; we move on and then two years 
after that, it was quiet. 
 (Noveon Marketing Director of 
Performance Coating, 16 May 2002)  
In order to have a complete picture about 
what happened during the operational phase, 
below we analyze how partner contribution, 
control, conflict and communication take 
place in their alliance.  
2.1. Partner Contribution 
Partner contribution in this alliance was 
related to the procurement of raw materials, 
the sharing of technology, and the utilization 
of market expertise. It was agreed that each 
party should buy their partner’s core product 
to make a mixture for their joint compound 
product. In terms of financial aspects, Avebe 
and Noveon did not have a joint budget for 
this project because each absorbed its own 
costs. They were compatible in terms of 
know-how and manpower. Noveon’s know-
how was completely different compared to 
Avebe’s knowledge, which was more in starch 
technology. Noveon is a chemical corporation, 
therefore, its knowledge in synthetics was 
excellent but its know-how in natural starch 
was relatively weak, and vice versa for Avebe. 
In addition, both parties have a 
complementary market expertise. Avebe has a 
strong marketing power in Europe and the Far 
East, and Noveon has an outstanding position 
in the American market. Such complementary 
match in knowledge and market produced an 
equal degree of contribution in this alliance, 
which is illustrated by the following quotes,  
Partner contribution was fairly divided 
between us. Both parties were equally 
competent in terms of technology and the 
market. There was no imbalance in 
contribution. Noveon or Avebe were not 
2008 Wahyuni 
 
49 
stronger in either of that area. It was 
pretty equal. We were talking in the same 
language. We both knew everything that 
needed to be known about how we should 
print, what was needed in the thickeners, 
how we should sell the product, etc. In 
my perspective, we were talking like 
pairs. I didn’t see any strong 
disproportion here. 
(Noveon Marketing Director of 
Performance Coating, 16 May 2002) 
Unfortunately, both companies have some 
difficulties in selling the product because of 
the high switching cost of the product. In 
Mexico, they did several printing trials that 
yielded really good results but the customers 
were unwilling to pay a significant increase in 
the price of this product, which was 200% 
higher than the average market price. In North 
America, there was a diminishing trend in the 
dye printing market because of the financial 
crisis in Asia. Since 1997, American industries 
abandoned apparel production and focused 
further on pigment printing. The growing 
apparel market was moved to Asia, where the 
cost of production was relatively cheaper than 
in America. Noveon had tried to sell this blend 
in China but they had to compete with 
alginate, which was derived from a natural 
product, seaweed. Unfortunately, the largest 
production of alginate was in China; hence it 
was difficult to enter this market because the 
competitor asked for a much lower price than 
what Noveon offered.  
Regarding the expectation and the real 
contribution of their partner, one of the Avebe 
managers commented,  
When we talk about the development 
stage, I think there was no difference bet-
ween the expectation and the real contri-
bution they brought in this cooperation. 
The development of the product was 
excellent. In general, people at several 
levels worked very well together, we have 
a very high level of cooperation. The 
reason that it did not work out is that we 
did not expect the problem in the market 
and the market did not expect the 
properties of our product. In the end, the 
market was not completely as expected. 
The knowledge of the market was not at 
the right level and the way each of us 
went to the market was not sufficient. We 
started quickly with too many problems 
instead of going carefully step by step. We 
believed in the product but the reality was 
that each factory and each fabric had a 
different handling. We had to be very 
careful and treat the customer one by one.  
(Avebe R&D Director, 16 October 2001) 
A slightly different view was expressed by 
two Noveon managers,  
I don’t think we met our expectation..…a 
different pattern took over the gap. We 
were envisioning an ability to make a 
good quality product with a compatible 
price for the market (even lower than the 
typical synthetic polymer). We didn’t 
really achieve this expectation. We had a 
high performance product with a high 
price premium. There was a disconnection 
between vision and reality. It took a year 
to do the technical work and we realized 
that we did not reach the original vision. 
However, we were clear to each other that 
we were not compromising the original 
vision. 
(Noveon Marketing Director of 
Performance Coating, 16 May 2002) 
The above quotations reflect unfulfilled 
expectations of both parties. Nevertheless, no 
one blamed the other for the dissolution of the 
alliance. The causes for the failure of the 
product were complex. Besides a number of 
marketing obstacles (such as the high price of 
the product, insufficient technical support at 
the level of mills, and so on), there were also 
unexpected changes in the business trend as a 
response to the Asian financial crisis in 1997.  
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2.2. Spill-over of Control 
Since both companies came from the 
same industry, there is a possibility that they 
will compete to each other. Therefore this 
study is trying to see how spill over of control 
implemented in this alliance. Spill-over of 
control is co-related to a company’s effort to 
protect its core competences and prevent it 
from being leaked to an alliance partner. At 
the beginning of the partnership no 
competition exists because the market Avebe 
and Noveon served was completely different 
and separate. In America, the market was 
more synthetic-oriented (Noveon expertise) 
compared to Europe, which was more starch-
oriented (Avebe market area). Both companies 
had a dissimilar type of technology and 
different interest in business. Nevertheless, 
they were fully conscious of the fact that their 
partner could also become a competitor in the 
near future. Therefore to prevent their core 
competence leak to their direct 
competitor/alliance partner, both companies 
exercised three levels of protection: 
1.  Avoid direct competition in the market. 
They prevented competition in the market 
by signing an agreement to separate the 
market responsibilities. Noveon would 
concentrate on the American market and 
Avebe would be responsible for the Far 
East and European markets. Based on this 
agreement, they would not compete with 
each other. Even if one party would buy a 
company, which was a direct competitor of 
their partner, they did not allow 
competition on the product that they had 
developed together.  
2.  Protection of the core competence from the 
partner. Both parties did not disclose the 
composition of their own product to the 
other parties. Avebe did not know the 
ingredients in acrylate and likewise 
Noveon was unaware of the exact 
composition of Solvitose. It means that 
they could not simply break the alliance 
and asks other companies to make starch 
or acryl ate for them. 
3.  Protection of their core competence from 
competitors. In order to maintain their 
competitive advantages, Noveon and 
Avebe did not announce officially that 
they were working together and they did 
not apply to patent their joint product. In 
applying for a patent, they need to disclose 
the composition of their joint product that 
could cause them to lose their competitive 
advantage.  
Furthermore, since the market has already 
acknowledged these two companies as the 
producer of synthetic polymer and natural 
starch, they decided to keep their brand 
identities by giving a different name to the 
joint product. Noveon used the name of 
Carbopol RHP and Avebe labeled it as 
Solvitose RX 60. 
Those protections did not stimulate a 
conflict in this alliance because both partners 
had knowingly agreed to this arrangement. 
The only competition Avebe felt was the price 
competition at the beginning of the 
partnership. Although both partners did not 
know exactly how much their partners would 
buy, they already wanted to have a part of the 
profit immediately after selling their own 
product. A later commitment to split up the 
world into two exclusive markets indicated 
that they shielded their own position in those 
particular markets, which eventually 
decreased the degree of interdependency 
during the marketing stage.  
We expected a certain volume and price 
from both sides. We also divided the world 
between both of us. This was more a 
feeling of defending a position than saying 
that we were really together in the 
business. 
 (Avebe R&D Director, 9 July 2001) 
A few years after they had signed the 
alliance agreement, Noveon purchased a 
company called Freedom Chemical 
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Corporation that has plants all over the world, 
and one of its factories in Germany, namely 
Diamalt, was well known as one of Avebe’s 
competitors. Although Noveon management 
strongly insisted that they did not intend to 
compete with Avebe and disrupt Avebe’s 
position by purchasing one of the Avebe’s 
competitors, still they could not avoid 
competition in the market. 
Before this alliance, Noveon never 
entered into the starch business. A few 
years after, we were making starch by 
ourselves through the acquisition of 
Diamalt. Avebe took that as a negative 
signal that we were competitors. In fact, 
we were trying not to compete with them 
but they thought we were competitors. 
The competition was turning to be more 
difficult than what we anticipated before. 
For instance, in polyesters, we found 
ourselves against Avebe. We have a 
similar agent and we were entering into 
the same market that in the end created a 
conflict of interest between us. 
(Noveon Vice President of Technology, 16 
May 2002) 
2.3. Conflict 
This alliance can be characterized as 
having a low level of conflict. Throughout the 
years of operation, there were no major 
conflicts within the partnership. According to 
our respondents, there were three aspects that 
notably prevented a conflict: 
1. Personal chemistry. There was an excellent 
relationship between Avebe’s and 
Noveon’s managers who were initially 
involved in the project. 
2. The thrill of innovation. The sense of 
achievement that they created something 
marvelous gave strong energy to both 
parties to do their utmost in developing the 
new product. As a result, both companies 
were able to conduct an enormous number 
of trials in a very short period.  
3. High speed of learning. Everyone was 
excited and believed in the product that 
somehow created a positive atmosphere in 
the alliance.  
Those factors enabled the partners to get 
along very well in this alliance. Both partners 
believed and trusted each other. They talked in 
the same language that made cooperation 
smooth. As one of the Avebe managers 
commented,  
An important part of the cooperation is 
how does personality fit together. It is 
much more a human factor, which 
determines whether it is working or not.  
(Avebe R&D Director, 9 July 2001) 
The only conflict that appeared in this alliance 
was an internal conflict in the Avebe group, 
particularly between the marketing and the 
technical group.  
At that moment there was some tension 
between sales and marketing. The pre-
vious Avebe structure had an Indepen-
dent Sales Offices which obliged sales 
managers to report to the Sales Director 
and not to the Business Manager and 
that was the main problem in communi-
cation and cooperation. The customer’s 
obstacles in implementing this new 
product accumulated in the sales office 
and were not directly disseminated to the 
Business Manager. In the end, the custo-
mer became impatient with the solutions 
they were given for the new product.  
(Avebe R&D Director, 10 January 2002) 
This internal problem of communication 
in Avebe seemed to have an impact on the 
alliance. Customers became reluctant to 
continue using the product. Besides, some 
critical information was not distributed 
appropriately among the team members. 
Noveon did not know about the problem 
Avebe encountered in the market and vice 
versa. 
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Apart from the internal problem in Avebe, 
there was no conflict that occurred between 
Noveon and Avebe. Even after Noveon had 
purchased Diamalt (a direct competitor of 
Avebe), they asked Avebe’s opinion whether 
there would be a conflict of interest that could 
impede their cooperation.  
Nevertheless, some people at Avebe 
prophesied that the takeover of Diamalt could 
endanger the alliance relationship because 
Diamalt had the same knowledge and offered 
a cheaper starch compared to Avebe. Soon 
after Noveon bought Diamalt, they stopped 
purchasing Avebe’s natural thickeners.  
Initially, there was no conflict between 
Avebe and Noveon. We got along very 
well together. We believed and trusted 
each other. The problem came when 
Noveon acquired Diamalt. Avebe did not 
anticipate that development. Diamalt 
was also buying a product from us but 
their price was lower than Avebe. In my 
opinion, Avebe should have played the 
game better. If we had handled it 
properly, I think it would not have 
become a problem. 
(Former Avebe Product Manager, 8 
September 2001) 
The presence of Diamalt eventually 
stimulated a conflict of interest in the alliance 
but it was not the main reason for the alliance 
termination because communication had 
already stopped at that time.  
It seems to be a loss of interest over time. 
Some of that may have been part of the 
taking over of Diamalt. I meant the lack 
of interest could have been associated to 
Diamalt’s acquisition because they were 
not assured of what we were doing. We 
were trying to assure that we will not go 
into modification that Avebe was doing 
and we would continue to work with 
them but at the same time we were 
selling natural thickeners in the same 
market. They were getting a conflicted 
message. Before, everything was working 
very well. 
(Noveon Vice President of Technology, 
12 July 2002) 
2.4. Communication 
In the beginning of their collaboration, the 
communication was excellent and characte-
rized by open exchange of information.  
The communication between us was 
excellent. Besides an official meeting at 
least two times a year, we also had 
intensive exchange information via 
phone, fax and email. 
(Noveon Marketing Director of 
Performance Coating, 16 May 2002) 
 Unfortunately, some people at Noveon 
and Avebe who were dedicated to this alliance 
moved to other positions/companies that 
eventually decreased the commitment of this 
project. The communication started to falter 
after they left and finally stopped after both 
companies faced failure in the market. As a 
result, Noveon and Avebe did not know 
precisely what problem each company 
encountered in their exclusive market.  
I saw there was a bit of an issue in 
communication that we were not being 
open with each other about what we 
were doing. I never knew what the Avebe 
marketing was doing. For example, if I 
know the problem, I can tell you the 
solution but if I don’t know the problem 
how can I give you a solution? If I am 
not communicating, I don’t know 
whether there is a technical problem or 
perhaps there is no technical problem. 
So, I don’t know exactly what the cause 
of failure of the alliance is. Even today, I 
don’t know why we discontinued and 
what the impression of Avebe about this 
was. 
(Noveon Senior Regional Manager Asia 
Pacific, 16 May 2002) 
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It was not clear why this alliance 
terminated. It came from Noveon or 
Avebe. I even did not know whether 
Noveon marketed this product or not. 
(Avebe Senior Scientist Printing, 9 July 
2001) 
 
It was strange that both companies did not 
know the reason behind the alliance 
termination. The two quotations above show 
that no communication and interaction 
hampered the parties involved. The lack of 
communication not only led to ambiguity 
about the cause of failure of the alliance but 
also hampered the mutual understanding that 
should be nurtured between both parties.  
It is also important to consider that the 
difference in culture between the Americans 
and the Dutch had an influence on how they 
viewed the business. Americans tend to be 
more aggressive in achieving their goals. This 
different attitude in business was one of the 
reasons why Noveon had given up sooner than 
Avebe. When they found that there was a 
diminishing trend in the American reactive 
printing market and the sale of the product did 
not fulfill their expectation, Noveon did not 
continue its effort to launch the product in the 
market. 
Americans tend to be aggressive, we 
want a rapid result and that is not 
always the same in another culture. I 
think Avebe wanted a result but they 
were willing to wait longer. We were 
expecting the result much faster than 
perhaps Avebe could or understood what 
we wanted. I don’t think they understood 
the way American business operated and 
demanded the result. Avebe is more 
deliberate, more patient in what they are 
trying to achieve, while we are saying: 
“we need to get it done….let’s go!” 
(Noveon Vice President of Technology, 
16 May 2002) 
Another communication problem that 
obviously appeared in this alliance was 
associated with language. Although the Dutch 
managers involved in this alliance speak 
English fluently, their interpretation of 
American English might be different. They 
understood the words but how they used it in 
their country might be completely different. 
We talked to one another but talking was 
not necessarily communicating. We 
talked but perhaps the ideas did not go 
across. I think occasionally we were 
probably saying the same things and 
both of us interpreting differently. When 
they came back a month later with the 
question, then we knew that they didn’t 
get what we were trying to say. 
(Noveon Vice President of Technology, 
16 May 2002) 
Therefore, it is important for managers to 
continuously be aware of the fact that the 
perception of a particular word can differ from 
one country to another. One word can have 
multiple meanings and our intonation reflects 
what we are introducing. When people learn 
English outside the native-speaking countries, 
they learn one meaning for the word and 
sometimes they do not understand the 
subtleties of the language. This situation could 
be a source of misunderstanding in cross-
border partnerships. 
3. Evaluation Phase 
Noveon and Avebe admit that they had an 
excellent relationship during their partnership. 
Their joint product development resulted in a 
superior product for the reactive printing 
market. In this respect, they were successful in 
meeting their objectives to develop a superior 
product for the reactive dye printing market. 
Unfortunately this cooperation was less 
profitable than they expected. Both parties 
could not successfully sell the joint product in 
the marketplace,  
In general terms, we are satisfied with 
the relationship we had. Our partners 
were hardworking and honest people. 
There were no cultural differences that 
 Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Indonesia Januari 
 
54 
could block the cooperation. In this 
respect, we are happy to work with them. 
On the other side, we are not fully 
satisfied that both companies suffered the 
same problem. They did not place 
enough attention on the marketing of the 
product. The commitment given to the 
project was not good enough. 
(Former Avebe Managing Director 
Business Unit Technical Applications, 9 
August 2001) 
A slightly different evaluation was made by 
the American partner,  
In general, Noveon are not satisfied with 
the alliance. It started up with the best 
intention but it did not work. I don’t think 
either one of us made any money from it. 
We expected that it would be a long-
lasting relationship and it did not turn 
out to be like that. I think there is 
disappointment from both sides. I don’t 
think we hate each other but indeed there 
is disappointment. I see it as a failure. 
During the alliance, I think the 
relationship was fine. We had an 
excellent personal relationship. If both 
parties intended to keep the contact, I 
think there is still a possibility to solidify 
the relationship. 
(Noveon Vice President of Technology, 
16 May 2002) 
The two quotations above directly or 
indirectly express unsatisfactory feelings of 
both parties involved particularly on the sales 
performance of the product. Interestingly, 
there are no hard feelings between them; 
somehow both companies still hope to gain 
synergy together.  
Noveon was a good partner, the feeling 
is that they did not have the energy to 
fight for this product in the market. But 
also internal changes of responsibilities 
killed the focus. 
(Avebe Business Manager Industrial 
Specialties, 9 July 2001) 
Similar sentiments were expressed by their 
American partner,  
The dissolution of this alliance does not 
mean that Avebe is a terrible company. I 
still believe that Avebe is a very good 
company. They have an excellent 
technology and they are probably some 
of the world’s leaders in natural 
thickeners technology. I think they are 
still the right people to work with. 
(Noveon Vice President of Technology 
May 16, 2002) 
Noveon management perceived that the 
failure of this alliance was not related to the 
company or people who worked for this 
project. There was a high level of mutual trust 
between people who were committed to this 
partnership. What they did not do was work 
hard enough to maintain it. Besides, a number 
of things changed, and unfortunately they did 
not move fast enough to follow the changes 
and adapt to those changes.  
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This case provides a pertinent example 
about how an alliance should deal with 
unexpected situations that may arise in their 
partnership. Avebe and Noveon were not only 
coerced to deal with the unpredictable 
response of the market but ought to manage 
the degree of competition that existed between 
both parties.  
Noveon and Avebe evaluated this alliance 
as an unsuccessful alliance. Although the 
development of the product resulted in a 
superior product for the reactive printing 
market neither party has an excellent sales 
performance for this joint product. Both 
parties were undeniably disappointed. From 
the above case study, we may draw a 
conclusion about the causes of failure in this 
alliance (see Figure 4).  
We may conclude that the unsuccessful 
sales performance of the product was the most 
dominant factor for the discontinuity of this 
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alliance, which point to unfulfilled expec-
tations in this alliance. In addition, there was a 
lack of communication and commitment to 
this alliance so that both parties did not set any 
move to initiate a discussion about the failure 
of the product and find a mutual solution to 
make the product acceptable in the highly 
competitive market. It is important to note that 
there are ample products that failed in the first 
production but finally achieved a tremendous 
success after several adjustments by the 
producers. The possibility of success is always 
present if both parties maintain a high 
commitment to a project. Communication and 
commitment play an important role here. The 
suggestion of Buchel et al. (1998) that 
communication must perform four functions: 
the guidance function (instruction and 
feedback), the information function (reduction 
of uncertainty), the socialization function 
(communicating “we-feeling”), and the 
coordination function (harmonization, 
clarification of dependencies) apparently did 
not eventuate in this alliance. Noveon never 
knew the outcome of the Avebe marketing 
campaign and vice versa. As a result, neither 
knew about the problems that the other party 
encountered in the market, which ultimately 
hampered mutual understanding in this 
partnership. The “we-feeling” decreased from 
time to time. This case also indicates the two 
important cultural differences that need to be 
taken into consideration when we deal with 
partners that are culturally and geographically 
different. In this respect, both parties need to 
be aware of the different styles of manage-
ment and the ways subtleties in language 
affect communication.  
 On the top of that, managers have to be 
aware the importance of managing the degree 
of interdependency throughout the whole 
alliance relationship. This aspect literally 
evaporated after Noveon purchased Diamalt.
 
Figure 4. The causes of failure of the alliance: Two different perspectives 
AVEBE NOVEON 
Causes of Failure 
 Long development of the product 
 High switching cost 
 Marketing mistakes: no specialization of the 
sales, lack of coordination between sales and 
marketing, lack of preparation, lack of infor-
mation to the customer, no technical support 
for the customer, no focus on the customer 
 Reorganization decreased the commitment to 
the project 
 No strong value proposition 
 Long development of the product 
 Discouragement 
 The changing focus of business 
 
 Less focus on the customer 
 
 Reorganization decreased the com-
mitment to the project 
Lessons from Failure 
1. A good value proposition to the mills 
2. An excellent technical support in the marketplace 
3. Customer selection and marketing focus 
4. More focus on the end price of the product than their individual profit 
5. A high commitment to the project 
6. The binding energy in the alliance should be more than the chemistry of individuals 
involved 
7. An excellent communication and a solid teamwork 
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Finally, this case provides us an excellent 
example of the significant role of team 
management in an alliance. Katzenbach and 
Smith (1993) define successful team mana-
gement as a team that always jointly develops 
clear goals and approaches by establishing 
communication that supports real-time pro-
blem solving and initiative. By surmounting 
obstacles together, people on teams build trust 
and confidence in each other’s capabilities. As 
a result, teams can adjust their approach to 
new information and challenges with greater 
speed, accuracy, and effectiveness. This 
situation did not exist during the operational 
phase of this alliance. The high commitment 
that existed at the beginning of the partnership 
simply disappeared after a number of key 
players moved away. It is apparent that 
management was lacking in the team 
responsible for the alliance, which eventually 
led to misunderstanding and dissolution of this 
cooperation. 
Summing up, we may conclude that the 
termination of this alliance was caused by the 
unfulfilled expectations of the companies, the 
lack of control in the alliance as a result of 
inadequate commitment to this project and 
poor communication. Besides, the low degree 
of interdependencies has apparently 
diminished the energy of the people to 
continue this alliance. Finally, insufficient 
team management added its toll and 
contributed to alliance discontinuity.  
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